




In the canonical learning model, the multi-armed bandit with independent arms, a decision
maker learns about the di®erent alternatives by his experience only. It is well known that an
optimal experimentation strategy for this problem sometimes leads the best alternative to be
dropped altogether, the so-called Rothschild e®ect. Many situations of interest, however, involve
learning from individual experience and the experience of others. This paper shows that learn-
ing in society can overcome the Rothschild e®ect. We consider an economy with a continuum
of in¯nitely lived agents where each one of them faces a two-armed bandit and the unknown
stochastic payo®s of each arm are the same for all agents. In each period, agents are randomly
and anonymously matched in pairs, where they observe their partners' current action choice.
We establish that if initial beliefs are su±ciently heterogeneous, then the fraction of agents who
choose the superior arm converges to one in any perfect bayesian equilibrium of this game.
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11 Introduction
The de¯ning characteristic of an experimentation problem is the tradeo® between learning about
the di®erent available alternatives, which provides valuable information for future decisions, and
maximizing immediate rewards. In the canonical learning model, the multi-armed bandit with
independent arms, this tradeo® implies that an optimal experimentation strategy can lead the
superior alternative to be dropped altogether, see Banks and Sundaram (1992). This is sometimes
referred to as the Rothschild e®ect. However, in many situations of interest an agent can learn
from the experience of other agents that face the same problem. Examples include consumers
learning about product quality and doctors learning about the e±cacy of di®erent treatments for
the same disease. In this paper we show how the presence of information °ows across individuals
can overturn the Rothschild e®ect.
We consider a discrete time economy populated with a continuum of in¯nitely lived agents where
each one of them faces a two-armed bandit with independent arms. The unknown stochastic payo®s
to each of the available action choices are the same for all agents, i.e., agents are homogeneous.
Information is transmitted across agents in the following way. In every period, agents are randomly
and anonymously matched in pairs, where they observe their partner's current action choice. We
refer to these matches as meetings in society.
In this environment, an agent's °ow payo® depends only on his action choice. Di®erently from
the standard bandit problem though, the action choices of the other individuals in the population
reveal information about the available alternatives. At any point in time, the likelihood an agent
has of being matched to someone else that chooses a speci¯c action is determined by the behavior
of the other agents. If these matching probabilities depend on the true payo®s of the action choices,
the meetings in society reveal payo® relevant information even if outcomes are not observable within
a match. Consequently, when choosing an action, an agent has to take into consideration: (i) the
tradeo® between the °ow payo®s from the di®erent alternatives and the information they provide;
(ii) the fact that, independently of what he chooses, his meetings in society provide information
about the available alternatives. The hypothesis of random and anonymous matchings implies that
each agent only cares about the aggregate behavior of the other agents in the population.
2It turns out that the individual learning problem, i.e., the experimentation problem each agent
has to solve when he takes the behavior of all the other agents as given, is formally equivalent
to a multi-armed bandit with correlated arms. Easley and Kiefer (1988) study limiting behavior
in a large class of in¯nite horizon individual experimentation problems, including multi-armed
bandits with correlated arms. They only consider stationary problems, however, while here we
must consider non-stationary ones. Indeed, aggregate behavior changes over time if learning takes
place. Hence, matching probabilities also change over time, and with them the informational
content of the meetings in society.
Most of the literature on social learning only considers purely informational interaction among
individuals. For example, Smallwood and Conlisk (1979), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995),
and Bala and Goyal (1999) consider models of social learning with boundedly rational agents.
Banarjee (1992), Bikhchandani et. al. (1992), and Smith and Sorensen (2000) consider sequential
decision models with rational agents. Of the few papers that deal with strategic and informational
interaction among individuals, Aoyagi (1998) and Bolton and Harris (1999) are the closest in spirit
to this paper.1 Both of them consider games of strategic experimentation with a ¯nite number
of players. In Bolton and Harris there is no asymmetric information, since the outcome of each
player's action choice is public. In Aoyagi, an individual's action choice is public, but not its
outcome. He shows, under certain restrictions, that in any Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
game all players eventually settle on the same action choice, not necessarily the superior one.
This article is structured as follows. The model is introduced in the next section. Section 3
contains some preliminary discussion. Section 4 considers the individual learning problem. There
we establish a characterization result that plays an important role in the analysis of long-run
aggregate behavior. The main result of the paper, that the fraction of the population choosing
the superior action converges to one in any perfect bayesian equilibrium of this game when initial
beliefs are su±ciently heterogenous, is established in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and several
appendices contain omitted proofs.
Some conventions, de¯nitions, and facts. Unless otherwise stated, measurability is always
understood to be Borel measurability. Finite sets are endowed with the discrete topology and
products of topological spaces are endowed with the product topology. For any set B, IB denotes
its indicator function and B¡t denotes the set £1
k=t+1B.
1See also Keller et. al. (2005).
3If S is a metric space, B(S) denotes its Borel ¾-algebra and P(S) denotes the set of all Borel
probability measures on S. Let (­;F) be a measure space, S be a complete separable metric space
(a Polish space), and endow P(S) with the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.
A F-measurable map ¸ : ­ ! P(S) is transition probability from (­;F) into (S;B(S)).2 In what
follows, we always omit B(S) and say ¸ is a transition probability from (­;F) into S. Moreover,
if ­ is a metric space and ¸ : ­ ! P(S) is measurable, we also omit F(= B(­)). In particular, if
¸ : ­ ! P(S) is continuous, then ¸ is a (continuous) transition probability from ­ into S.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 Z+. The economy is populated with a continuum of
mass one of in¯nitely lived agents that we identify with ([0;1];§;¹), where § is the ¾-algebra of
Lebesgue measurable subsets of [0;1] and ¹ is the Lebesgue measure on [0;1]. All agents have the
same discount factor ¯ 2 [0;1). We denote a typical element of [0;1] by i.
Every period has two parts. First, each agent privately chooses one of N actions, labelled 1 to
N, observes a stochastic outcome y 2 Y , and collects a reward r(j;y), where j 2 A = f1;:::;Ng
denotes his action choice. We also use k to denote an action choice. The outcome space Y is a
Polish space and the value of y is determined independently for each agent in the population. Then,
all agents are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs, where they observe the current action
choice of their partners. We assume that each agent randomly chooses an action in period zero.3
The outcome of each action j depends on a parameter µj that is the same for all agents. The
set £j of possible values of µj is ¯nite. We refer to the value of µj as the true type of j and to the
set £ = £1£¢¢¢££N, with typical element µ = (µj), as the set of states of the world. The value of
µ is initially unknown to the agents. To each pair (j;µj) is associated a Borel probability measure
¹j(µj) on Y that governs the realization of outcomes when j is chosen and its true type is µj. The
maps µj 7! ¹j(µj) are assumed to be one-to-one.
2This de¯nition coincides with the usual one; i.e., ¸ : ­ ! P(S) is F-measurable if, and only if, for each D 2 B(S),
the map ! 7! ¸(!)(D) is F-measurable.
3This assumption is irrelevant for our results. With it, the individual learning problem ¯ts the description of
a dynamic programming problem with unknown transition probabilities, see Rieder (1975). It also allows us to
introduce the requirement of sequential rationality in the agents' behavior in a compact way.
4Let ¦ = P(£) denote the set of beliefs about the state of the world, beliefs for short. Then,
¦ = ¢S, where S+1 = ¦N
j=1j£jj. The case of interest is when
PN
j=1 j£jj ¸ N +1. Denote a typical
element of ¦ by ¼ and the probability that ¼ assigns to µ, the belief that the state of the world
is µ, by ¼(µ). Now let ¦d = f¼ 2 ¦ : ¼ = ¼1 £ ¢¢¢ £ ¼N; with ¼j 2 P(£j)g. Each agent begins
period zero with a non-dogmatic prior in ¦d. Hence, in the absence of the meetings in society, the
problem of the agents is a multi-armed bandit with independent arms.
Prior beliefs may be heterogeneous. There is a measurable function © : I ! ¦ such that ©(i)
is the prior belief of the agent i. Notice that the range of © must be in the (relative) interior of ¦d.
We also assume that the range of © is countable.




µj2£j ¹j(µj). By de¯nition, the measures ¹j(µj)
are absolutely continuous with respect to !. Denote the density of ¹j(µj) with respect to ! by
gj(¢;µj). Now let rj(µj) =
R
r(j;y)gj(y;µj)!(dy) be the expected °ow payo® from j when its true
type is µj. We make the following assumptions. The ¯rst three are regularity assumptions. The
fourth rules out the case where there is at least one state of the world where the expected rewards
from two or more of the available action choices are the same. The ¯fth implies that the maps
µj 7! rj(µj) are one-to-one. The last assumption implies that for each j there is at least one state
of the world where this action is the best alternative.
ASSUMPTION 1. The reward function r : A £ Y ! R is bounded.
ASSUMPTION 2. For each j and y 2 Y there exists µ such that gj(y;µj) > 0.
ASSUMPTION 3.
R
ymgj(y;µj)!(dy) < 1 when m = 1;2 for all j and µ.
ASSUMPTION 4. rj(µj) 6= rk(µk) for all µ and j 6= k.
ASSUMPTION 5. µj 6= µ0
j implies that rj(µj) 6= rj(µ0
j).
ASSUMPTION 6. For each j there exists µ such that rj(µj) > rk(µk) for all k 6= j.
By Assumption 4, there exists J ½ A with N ¡ 1 elements such that if j 2 J, then there is
µj with the property that rj(µj) < minµk rk(µk) for k 2 A n J. Let £j be the set of all such µj's.
Assumption 6 implies that £j is a proper subset of £j for all j 2 J. In what follows, we assume
that J = f1;:::;N ¡ 1g.
53 Preliminaries
An agent's experience in a given period is a triple (j;y;k), where j is his action choice, y is the
outcome of j, and k is the (current) action choice of his partner. Let X = Y £A be the observation
space, i.e., the set of possible one-period observations an agent can make, and let Z = A £ X be
the set of possible action-observation pairs. Then, Ht = Zt is the set of period t histories and
H1 = Z1 is the set of in¯nite histories. Denote a typical element of X by x = (x1;x2), a typical
element of Zt by zt, and a typical element of Ht by ht = (j0;x0;:::;jt¡1;xt¡1). A behavior strategy
is a sequence f = fftgt2N, where ft : Ht ! ¢N¡1 is the measurable function describing how period
t ¸ 1 histories are mapped into probability measures over A. By convention, the jth coordinate of
an element of ¢N¡1 denotes the probability that j is chosen.
We now de¯ne what a strategy pro¯le is in this environment. For this, some terminology is
needed. Let S be a metric space and X be a Banach space with norm jj¢jj. The set of all bounded
and measurable functions from S into X is denoted by Bb(S;X) (or Bb(S) when X = R1). We
always take this set to be endowed with the sup-norm, in which case it is a Banach space. A
function f : [0;1] ! X is simple if there exist x1;:::;xm 2 X and E1;:::;Em 2 § such that
f =
Pm
k=1 xkIEk. A function f : [0;1] ! X is strongly Lebesgue measurable if there exists a
sequence ffng of simple functions such that limn jjfn(i) ¡ f(i)jj = 0 for almost all i 2 [0;1]. If
f is simple and E 2 §, the integral
R
E f¹ is de¯ned as
P
k xk¹(Ek \ E). A strongly Lebesgue
measurable function f : [0;1] ! X is Bochner integrable if there is a sequence ffng of simple
functions such that
R
jjfn(i)¡f(i)jj¹(di) = 0, in which case
R
E f¹ is de¯ned as the limit of
R
E fn¹.
The set of all equivalence classes of Bochner integrable functions is denoted by L1(¹;X) (or L1(¹),
in case X = R).
Let ¡t = Bb(Ht;RN) and ­t = ff 2 ¡t : f(ht) 2 ¢N¡1 for all ht 2 Htg. Then, ­ = £t2N­t is
the set of all possible behavior strategies. Now let ªt = Bb(¦;­t) and ª = £t2N­t. An element of ª
is what we call a prior-contingent behavior strategy. Denote an arbitrary element of L1(¹;Bb(¦;¡t))
by Ft and de¯ne, in an abuse of notation, L1(¹;ªt) to be set of Ft in L1(¹;Bb(¦;¡t)) such that
¹(fi : Ft(i) 2 ªtg) = 1. We take ¤ = £t2NL1(¹;ªt) as the set of possible strategy pro¯les. This
de¯nition captures the notion that each agent in the population is non-atomic, and so his particular
choice of prior-contingent behavior strategy has no aggregate e®ect.
6Suppose F = fFtg 2 ¤ is the strategy pro¯le under play and denote the canonical basis of RN
by fe1;:::;eNg. Given h1 2 H1, the probability that agent i chooses j 2 A is hF1(i)(©(i))(h1);eji.
By assumption, all agents randomize in period zero. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, this
implies that the fraction of the population that chooses a given action in period zero is the same in
every state of the world, 1
N. Hence, when the state of the world is µ, the probability that i chooses








where G1(i) = F1(i)(©(i)). The above integral is well-de¯ned by Corollary 2 in Appendix A
together with Theorem 13.4 in Aliprantis and Border (1999). By Lemma 9 in Appendix A, the
function p1 : [0;1] £ A £ £ £ ¤ ! [0;1] just de¯ned is Lebesgue measurable in i. Consequently,
once more because there is no aggregate uncertainty, the measure of agents who choose j in period




This number is also the probability, when the state of the world is µ and F is under play, that in
period one an agent is matched to a partner whose current action is j.
From the matching probabilities m1(j;µ;F) we can construct the map ¿2 : [0;1]£££¤ ! P(H2)
such that if D 2 B(H2), then ¿2(i;µ;F)(D) is the probability that agent i experiences h2 2 D when
the state of the world is µ and F is under play. It is possible to show (see Appendix B) that for each
µ and F, the map ¿2(¢;µ;F) is a transition probability from ([0;1];§) into H2. The probability, as




where G2(i) = F2(i)(©(i)). Given the functions p2 : [0;1]£A£££¤ ! [0;1] we can then construct,
in the same way as in the previous paragraph, the period two matching probabilities m2(j;µ;F).
Continuing with this process, we obtain a sequence m = fmtg, where mt = fmt(j;µ;F)gj2A;µ2£
is the vector of period t matching probabilities; i.e., mt(j;µ;F) is the fraction of agents who choose
j in period t when the state of the world is µ and the strategy pro¯le is F. The details can be
found in Appendix B. Let ¥ = £t2Z+¢S+1
N¡1 and denote by M the map that takes an element F of
¤ into its corresponding sequence m(F) 2 ¥ of matching vectors.
7Because the matching process is random and anonymous, the in¯nite sequence m of matching
vectors subsumes all the informational content of the meetings in society. In other words, besides
outcomes and rewards, the individual learning problem is characterized by the sequence m of
matching vectors.
Denote by ¾µ(h1;f;m) the Borel probability measure on Z1 induced by the period zero action-
observation pair h1, the behavior strategy f, and the in¯nite sequence of matching vectors m when
the state of the world is µ.4 Now let zt = (jt;xt) be the period t action-observation pair and de¯ne
R : Z1 ! R to be such that if z1 = fztg, then R(z1) =
P1
t=1 ¯t¡1r(jt;x1t), where x1t is the ¯rst









R(z1)¾µ(dz1jh1;f;m)¼0(µ) 8h1 2 H1: (1)
Observe that if e r : A£ X ! R is such that e r(at;xt) = r(at;x1t), then R(z1) =
P1
t=1 ¯t¡1e r(at;xt).
Hence, the individual learning problem is equivalent to a non-stationary multi-armed bandit with
correlated arms where the reward function is e r and the outcome space is X.
De¯nition: A perfect bayesian equilibrium is a pro¯le F¤ 2 ¤ such that if m = M(F¤), then, for
almost all i 2 [0;1], F¤(i)(¼0) satis¯es (1) for all ¼0 2 ¦d.
4 The Individual Learning Problem
We ¯rst describe the individual learning problem and establish a few basic results. We then
discuss a result concerning belief updating in the presence of meetings in society. We ¯nish with a
characterization result, Theorem 1, that plays a central role in the next section.
4.1 Description and Basic Results
De¯ne ´µ




±j is the Dirac measure on A with mass on j. By construction, ´µ
t(m) is the probability measure
describing the outcome of the matching process in period t when the state of the world is µ and
the sequence of matching vectors is m. Now let ºµ
t : A £ ¥ ! P(X) be such that ºµ
t (j;m) =
4Notice that ¾µ(h1;f;m) also depends on the measures ¹j(µj).
5We ignore the period zero payo®s.
8¹j(µj) £ ´µ
t(m). By de¯nition, ºµ
t (j;m) is the probability measure describing the distribution of
possible period t observations as a function of µ, j, and m.
For each prior ¼0 and sequence of matching vectors m, the individual learning problem is
a non-stationary markovian decision problem (DP) with state space X and unknown transition
probabilities fºµ
t gt2Z+;µ2£, see Rieder (1975).6 In this section we make use of the fact that this
problem is equivalent to a certain non-stationary non-markovian DP with state space X and known
transition probabilities. From now on we use ILP to refer to the individual learning problem and
ILP to refer to the equivalent DP with known transitions.
We ¯rst derive the transition probabilities for ILP. For this, let Bt : ¦ £ A £ X £ ¥ ! ¦ be













The term on the right-hand side of the last equation is well-de¯ned by Assumption 2. By de¯nition,
if the sequence of matching vectors is m, an agent who in t has belief ¼, chooses j, and observes
x revises his belief to Bt(¼;j;x;m). Now let f¼tgt2N, with ¼t : Ht £ ¦ £ ¥ ! ¦, be such that
¼1(j0;x0;¼0;m) = B1(¼0;j0;x0;m) and ¼t+1(ht;jt;xt;¼0;m) = Bt(¼t(ht;¼0;m);jt;xt;m) for t ¸ 1.
By construction, ¼t(ht;¼0;m) is the period t belief of an agent with history ht when his prior is ¼0
and the sequence of matching vectors is m. Notice that ¼1 is independent of m as the meetings in
society when t = 0 are uninformative. By Lemma 10 in Appendix C, for each ¼0 2 ¦ and m 2 ¥,






From above, for each ¼0 2 ¦ and m 2 ¥, qt(¢;¼0;m) is a transition probability from Ht £ A into
X. The maps fqt(¢;¼0;m)g are the transitions probabilities for ILP as a function of the prior belief
and the sequence of matching vectors.
6In Rieder's terminology, the initial distributions for the individual learning problem are the measures f¿1(µ)gµ2£,
where ¿1 : £ ! P(H1) is the transition probability de¯ned in Appendix B.
9The set Ht of period t histories for ILP is the same as the set of period t histories for ILP, and so
both problems have the same set of behavior strategies. For consistency in notation, denote the set
of behavior strategies for ILP by ­. Fix ¼0 2 ¦, m 2 ¥, and let rj(ht) =
P
µ2£ rj(µj)¼t(ht;¼0;m)(µ)
be the expected °ow payo® from choosing j in period t as a function of ht. Now let R : H1 ! R




1 is the restriction of h1 to Ht and jt is the
period t action choice. Moreover, let ¾(¼0;h1;f;m) =
P
µ ¼0(µ)¾µ(h1;f;m). The objective in ILP





R(h1z1)¾(dz1j¼0;h1;f;m) 8h1 2 H1;
where if hk 2 Hk and zt 2 Zt, then hkzt is the concatenation of hk and zt. It is straightforward to
show that f¤ is an optimal strategy for ILP if, and only if, it is an optimal strategy for ILP.
As mentioned above, ILP is a non-markovian decision problem. Nevertheless, we can analyze
it using dynamic programming techniques. The Bellman equations for ILP are







= TtV t+1(ht); t 2 N: (2)
We start with a basic result. For each f 2 ­, let fjhk = fgtgt2Z+, where gt : Zt ! ¢N¡1 is such
that gt(zt) = fk+t(hkzt). Now let ¾t(¼0;ht;f;m) =
P
µ ¼0(µ)¾µ(fjht;mt), where ¾µ(fjht;mt) is the
Borel probability measure on Z1 induced by fjht and the sequence mt = fmkg1
k=t of matching
vectors when the state of the world is µ.7 Finally, let V
¤







The proof of the following result is in Appendix C.
Lemma 1. For each ¼0 2 ¦ and m 2 ¥, the sequence fV
¤
tg de¯ned by (3) is the unique sequence
of bounded and measurable functions that solves the Bellman equations (2).
The second result we prove is central for the characterization result established at the end of
this section. It shows that the sequence of maps f¼tg constitutes a su±cient statistic for ILP. Let
ºt : ¦£A£¥ ! P(X) be given by ºt(¼;j;m) =
P
µ2£ ¼(µ)ºµ
t (j;m) and de¯ne ½t : ¦£A£¥ ! P(¦)




7Notice that ¾µ(fjh1;m) = ¾µ(h1;f;m).
10By Lemma 11 in Appendix C, for each m 2 ¥, ½t(¢;m) is a continuous transition probability from
¦ £ A into ¦. Now let sj : ¦ ! R be such that sj(¼) =
P
µ2£ rj(µj)¼(µ) and, for each m 2 ¥,








= TtVt+1; t 2 N: (5)
It is convenient to introduce the operators Tt;j such that if v : ¦ ! R is measurable, then
Tt;jv(¼) = sj(¼) + ¯
Z
v(¼0)½t(d¼0j¼;j;m):
Lemma 2. For each m 2 ¥, there exists a unique sequence fV ¤
t g of bounded and measurable
functions that satis¯es (5). Moreover, for each ¼0 2 ¦, V
¤
t(ht) = V ¤
t (¼t(ht;¼0;m)).
Proof: The ¯rst part follows from Lemma 7 in Appendix A. For the second part, let wt : Ht ! R
be such that wt(ht) = V ¤
t (¼t(ht)), where the dependence of ¼t on ¼0 and m is omitted. By Lemma
















where the ¯rst equality follows from the de¯nitions of sj and ºt, the second follows from the
de¯nition of ¼t, and the third follows from the de¯nition of ½t. Hence, fwtg satis¯es the Bellman




What happens when an agent with a prior that assigns positive probability to the true type of a
particular action j chooses this action an in¯nite number of times? If it were the case that he only
observed the outcomes of his action choices, he would learn the true type of j with probability one.
This result on the consistency of Bayes estimates follows from the fact that each of the available
actions has a ¯nite number of possible types, the densities gj(y;µj) have ¯nite ¯rst and second
moments, and the maps µj 7! ¹j(µj) are one-to-one, see Section 10.5 in DeGroot (1970). It turns
11out that this is also true in the presence of the meetings in society. This is the content of Lemma
1 in Aoyagi (1998), that we state below adapted to our framework.
Fix the prior belief ¼0, the sequence of matching vectors m, and the behavior strategy f. Let
¼
j
µ;t : H1 ! [0;1] be given by ¼
j
µ;t(h1) = ¼t(ht
1;¼0;m))(fµjg££¡j), where £¡j = £k6=j£k. De¯ne
¾µ(f;m) 2 P(H1) to be such that if D1 2 B(Y ) and D2 2 B(Z1), then




where ¿1(µ)(D) is the probability an agent has of experiencing a period one history in D 2 B(H1).
See Appendix B for the construction of ¿1. Now let ¸(¼0;f;m) be the Borel probability measure on
££H1 such that if £0 µ £ and G 2 B(H1), then ¸(¼0;f;m)(£0 £G) =
P
µ2£0 ¼0(µ)¾µ(f;m)(G).
Finally, let Ej 2 B(H1) be the event where j is chosen in¯nitely many times.
Lemma 3. For each ¼0 2 ¦, m 2 ¥, and f 2 ­, ¸(¼0;f;m)((fµjg £ £¡j) £ Ej) > 0 implies that
¼
j
µ;t converges to one on (fµjg £ £¡j) £ Ej almost surely with respect to ¸(¼0;f;m).
4.3 Characterization
We now prove the main result of this section. For this, let r(µ) = maxj rj(µj) and de¯ne
















Notice that if ¼ is such that lj(¼) > 0, then sj(¼) > sk(¼) for all k 6= j. This, in turn, implies that
lk(¼) < 0 for all k 6= j. In other words, if ¦j = f¼ 2 ¦ : lj(¼) > 0g, then
T
j2A ¦j = ;. Also notice
that if £(j) = fµ 2 £ : rj(µj) > rk(µk) for k 6= jg is the set of states of the world where j is the
best alternative, then µ 2 £(j) implies that lj(¼) > 0 for all ¼ that put su±ciently high probability
on the event fµjg £ £¡j.
Theorem 1. Fix ¼0 2 ¦ and m 2 ¥, and suppose f¤ = ff¤
t g is an optimal strategy for ILP. If
¼t(ht;¼0;m) 2 ¦j, then f¤
t (ht) puts probability one on j.
The following result follows immediately from Theorem 1 together with Lemma 3.
Corollary 1. No optimal strategy for ILP has an agent choosing all actions in¯nitely many times.
12What makes Theorem 1 useful is that the functions lj, and so the sets ¦j, are independent of
matching probabilities. Hence, this theorem provides \bounds" on behavior that hold regardless of
the informational content of the meetings in society, i.e., they hold no matter the sequence m of
matching vectors.
To understand the meaning of the condition lj(¼) > 0, consider the hypothetical situation where
an agent learns the true value of µ if he chooses any action other than j. In this case, if his belief is
¼, his expected lifetime payo® from choosing k 6= j is sk(¼)+¯(1¡¯)¡1 P
µ2£ r(µ). Since, in truth,
learning about µ does not happen immediately (if it happens at all), the above payo® is an upper
bound for this agent's lifetime expected payo® when he chooses k. The condition lj(¼) > 0 then
says that even if an agent settles on j, which is not necessarily optimal, he is still better o® then
if he chooses any other action and behaves optimally in the periods that follow. In other words,
lj(¼) > 0 means that the agent is so pessimistic about the other actions that even if he could learn
µ by choosing one of them, he would still prefer to settle on j.




where Sjk and Sjj, with k 6= j, are the operators such that if v : ¦ ! R, then
Sjkv(¼) = sk(¼) + ¯
X
µ2£
v(±µ)¼(µ) and Sjjv(¼) = sj(¼) + ¯v(¼):
For each j, equation (6) has a unique continuous solution, that we denote by W¤
j . This function
is, moreover, convex and such that W¤
j (±µ) = (1 ¡ ¯)¡1r(µ). Since W¤
j (¼) ¸ (1 ¡ ¯)¡1sj(¼) for
all ¼ 2 ¦, SjjW¤
j (¼) > SjkW¤
j (¼) for all k 6= j when ¼ 2 ¦j. The proof of the next lemma is in
appendix C.
Lemma 4. Fix j 2 A and m 2 ¥. Then, for all k 6= j, t 2 N, and ¼ 2 ¦,
Tt;kV ¤
t+1(¼) ¡ Tt;jV ¤
t+1(¼) · SjkW¤
j (¼) ¡ SjjW¤
j (¼):








for all actions j. Hence, the desired result follows from Lemma 4 and the principle of optimality
for dynamic programming.
135 Long Run Behavior
We now establish the main result of this article. We say the full support assumption is satis¯ed
if ¹fi : ©(i) 2 Ag > 0 for every open subset A of ¦d.8
Theorem 2. Suppose N = 2 and the full support assumption holds. Then, in all perfect bayesian
equilibria of this game the fraction of agents who choose the best alternative converges to one
regardless of the state of the world.
The conclusion of Theorem 2 is not necessarily true when the full support assumption is not
satis¯ed. As an example, suppose that £1 = fµ1g, £2 = fµ21;µ22g, and r2(µ21) < r1(µ1) < r2(µ22).
This corresponds to the case of an one-armed bandit where the unknown arm can be of two types.
Moreover, suppose that a measure one of the agents has the same prior belief ¼0, where ¼0 has the
property that l1(¼1(¼0;a0;x0)) > 0 for all (a0;x0) 2 H1.9 In this particular case, the game has
an unique perfect bayesian equilibrium where almost all agents always choose a1 regardless of the
value of µ. This follows immediately from Theorem 1 together with the fact that the meetings in
society are uninformative when a measure one of agents choose the same action no matter the state
of the world.
The following two lemmas are needed for Theorem 2. Their proofs are in appendix D. Recall
that if µj 2 £j, then rj(µj) < rN(µN) for all µN, and that £(j) denotes the set of states of the
world where j is the best alternative.
Lemma 5. Let F¤ be a perfect bayesian equilibrium and suppose µ is such that µj 2 £j. Then,
mt(j;µ;F¤) converges to zero.
By Lemma 3, an agent who chooses a particular action j in¯nitely often learns its true type
as long as his prior belief assigns positive probability to this type. Therefore, when µ is such that
µj 2 £j, Theorem 1 and the assumption that all agents have non-dogmatic priors imply that an
agent following an optimal strategy plays j only a ¯nite number of times. Hence, in any equilibrium,
the measure of agents who choose j converges to zero in the long-run for all µ such that µj 2 £j.
8Suppose f¼ngn2Z+ is countable dense subset of the interior of ¦






0 : I ! ¦ to be such that ©
0(i) = ¼0 if i = 0 and ©
0(i) = ¼n if i 2 In. Notice that ©
0 is measurable. If
© = ©
0, the full support assumption is satis¯ed.
9This requires the likelihood ratios g1(¢;µ1)=g2(¢;µ2) to be bounded away from both zero and in¯nity.
14Lemma 6. Let F¤ be a perfect bayesian equilibrium and suppose µ 2 £(j). Then, under the full
support assumption, there exists m = m(F¤) > 0 such that mt(j;µ;F¤) ¸ m for all t 2 N.
Lemma 6 states that if the full support assumption holds, then whenever a particular action j
is the best alternative, the measure of agents who choose this action is bounded away from zero in
any perfect bayesian equilibrium of this game. The proof of this result is done in two parts. We
¯rst establish that if in period zero an agent knows the true type of all action choices but j and
assigns high enough probability to j's true type, then there is a positive probability that he always
chooses j. This part of the argument borrows from the techniques used in the proof of Theorem
5.1 in Banks and Sundaram (1992). In the second part, we use a continuity argument to show that
the same result holds for any agent with a prior that attaches su±ciently high probability to the
true state of the world. The desired result then follows from the full support assumption.
To illustrate the idea behind the proof of Theorem 2, consider the case where £1 = fµ11;µ12g,
£2 = fµ21;µ22g, and r1(µ11) < r2(µ21) < r1(µ12) < r2(µ22). By Lemma 5, if µ is such that µ1 = µ11,
then the measure of agents who choose a1 converges to zero in any equilibrium. Suppose now that
µ2 = µ21 and µ1 = µ12. By Lemma 6, the measures of agents who choose a1 are bounded away from
zero in all equilibria. Suppose then, by contradiction, that the measures of agents who choose a2
are also bounded away from zero. Any agent who chooses a2 in¯nitely many times, and there is a
positive measure of them who do so, learns that µ2 = µ12 by Lemma 3. At the same time, this agent
also observes that the measure of agents who choose a1 does not converge to zero in the long-run.
Since he knows that this measure converges to zero if µ1 = µ11, this agent learns that µ1 > µ2.
This, however, is a contradiction by Theorem 1. To ¯nish, consider the case where µ1 = µ12 and
µ2 = µ22. By Lemma 6, the measures of agents who choose a2 are bounded away from zero in any
equilibrium. Suppose, once more by contradiction, that the measures of agents who choose a1 are
also bounded away from zero. Any agent who chooses a1 in¯nitely often learns that µ1 = µ12. At
the same time, this agent observes that the fraction of agents who choose a2 does not converge to
zero. Since he knows that this fraction converges to zero when µ1 = µ12 and µ2 = µ21, he then
learns that µ2 > µ1, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2: Order the elements of £1 and £2, from lowest to highest, in terms of
their expected rewards. This is possible since the maps µj 7! rj(µj) are one-to-one. Then, £1 =
15fµ1
1;:::;µL
1 g and £2 = fµ1
2;:::;µK
2 g, where L+K ¸ 3. If G is a subset of £j and H is a subset of £k,
with j;k 2 f1;2g, write G < H when, rj(µj) < rk(µk) for all µj 2 A and µk 2 B. By assumption,
r1(µ1
1) < r2(µ1
2). There are two cases to consider, then. Either r1(µL
1 ) > r2(µK
2 ) or r1(µL
1 ) < r2(µK
2 ).
We consider the second case only. The modi¯cations required to adapt the argument that follows
to the ¯rst case are transparent.
Since r2(µK
2 ) > r1(µL
1 ), there exist m 2 N and sets £n
j , with j 2 f1;2g and n 2 f1;:::;mg,







j < ¢¢¢ < £m
j for all j 2 f1;2g, and £n
1 < £n
2 for all
n 2 f1;:::;mg. Let zj : £j ! f1;:::;mg be such that zj(µj) = n if µj 2 £n
j . Then, by construction,
z1(µ1) · z2(µ2) implies that r1(µ1) < r2(µ2) and z1(µ1) > z2(µ2) implies that r1(µ1) > r2(µ2). Now





2z1(µ1) ¡ 1 if z1(µ1) · z2(µ2)
2z2(µ2) if z2(µ2) < z1(µ1)
:
The proof is by induction in the range of ¨.
Suppose ¯rst that ¨ = 1. Then, µ 2 £ is such that µ1 2 £1 and we know, from Lemma 5,
that mt(1;µ;F¤) converges to zero if F¤ is a perfect bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Suppose now, by
induction, that there exists ¨ 2 N such that: (i) if ¨(µ) · ¨ is even, then mt(2;µ;F¤) converges to
zero if F¤ is a PBE; (ii) if ¨(µ) · ¨ is odd, then mt(1;µ;F¤) converges to zero if F¤ is a PBE. We
only consider the case where ¨ is odd, as the argument when ¨ is even is identical. By assumption,
if ¨(µ) = ¨+1, then r1(µ1) > r2(µ2) and z2 = (¡+1)=2. By Lemma 6, if F¤ is a PBE, there exists
m > 0 such that mt(1;µ;F¤) ¸ m for all t 2 N. Hence, there is a subsequence of fmt(1;µ;F¤)g
that converges to some ® > 0. Assume, without loss, that mt(1;µ;F¤) itself converges to ®.
Suppose then, by contradiction, that mt(2;µ;F¤) does not converge to zero (so that ® < 1).
The same argument used in the proof of Lemma 5 shows that a positive measure of agents chooses
2 in¯nitely many times. Now observe, by the induction hypothesis, that mt(1;µ;F¤) converges to
zero when z2(µ2) = (¨+1)=2 and z1(µ1) · z2(µ2), as this corresponds to the case where ¨(µ) · ¨.
Hence, by Lemma 13 in Appendix D, an agent who chooses 2 in¯nitely often learns that z1 > z2
with probability one. This, however, implies that almost all of the agents who choose 2 in¯nitely
many times eventually have a belief ¼ with l1(¼) > 0, a contradiction by Theorem 1. Therefore,
mt(2;µ;F¤) must converge to zero, and so the induction hypothesis is true for ¨+1. This concludes
the argument.
166 Conclusion
This paper shows how learning in society can overcome the incomplete learning results typical
of multi-armed bandits. We consider an environment with a continuum of agents where each one
of them faces a two-armed bandit and the unknown stochastic payo®s of each arm are the same
for all agents. Information °ows in a decentralized way: in every period all agents are randomly
and anonymously matched in pairs and they observe the current action choice of their partner.
We show that if initial beliefs are su±ciently heterogenous, then all perfect bayesian equilibria of
this game are ex-post e±cient; i.e., the fraction of the population choosing the best alternative
converges to one in these equilibria.
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18Appendix A
In this appendix we establish some auxiliary results. We begin with a generalization of the
contraction mapping theorem used in dynamic programming. For this, let fStg be a sequence
of Polish spaces, ¥ be a Polish space, and A be a ¯nite set. Denote a typical element of St by
st, a typical element of ¥ by », and a typical element of A by a. Moreover, for each t 2 N, let
qt : St £ A £ ¥ ! P(St+1) be such that qt( ¢ ;») is a transition probability from St £ A into St+1
for all » 2 ¥. Finally, for each t 2 N, let rt : St £ A ! R be bounded.








= TtVt+1(st); t 2 N: (A.1)
Lemma 7. For each » 2 ¥, there is a unique sequence fV ¤
t g of bounded and measurable functions
that satis¯es (A.1).
Proof: Fix » 2 ¥ and let B1 = £t2NBb(St). The space B1 is complete and metrizable when
endowed with the product topology. A metric d on B1 that is compatible with the product topology




1 + jjft ¡ gtjjsup
(A.2)
where fctg is any sequence of strictly positive numbers that converges to zero.
Consider now the map T such that if v = fvtg 2 B1, then Tv = fTtvt+1g. By assumption,
if v 2 Bb(St+1), the function
R
v(st+1)qt(dst+1jst;a;») is jointly measurable in st and a and is
bounded in st. Hence, since A is ¯nite, Ttv is a bounded and measurable function of st when
v 2 Bb(St+1). Consequently, T maps B1 into itself. If we show that T is a contraction, the desired
result is a consequence of the Banach ¯xed point theorem.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist g;h 2 B1 such that d(Tg;Th) ¸ d(g;h). This
implies that for all n 2 N there exists t(n) 2 N such that
ct(n)jjTt(n)gt(n) ¡ Tt(n)ht(n)jjsup


















1 + jjgt(n) ¡ ht(n)jjsup
:
19Rearranging terms, we have that














jjTt(n)gt(n) ¡ Tt(n)ht(n)jjsupjjgt(n) ¡ ht(n)jjsup
dt(n) | {z }
et(n)
;
where dt = (1+jjTtgt¡Tthtjjsup)(1+jjgt¡htjjsup). The sequence fet(n)g is, however, bounded, and
so 1
net(n) converges to zero. Since 1 ¡ 1
n ¡ ¯ converges to 1 ¡ ¯, we then have that the right-hand
side of the above inequality is positive if n is su±ciently large. Therefore,
jjTt(n)gt(n) ¡ Tt(n)ht(n)jjsup > ¯jjgt(n) ¡ ht(n)jjsup
for n large enough, contradicting the fact that the maps Tt are contractions of modulus ¯. We can
then conclude that T contraction.
Lemma 8. Let S be a metric space X be a Banach space. Suppose F : [0;1] ! Bb(S;X) is strongly
Lebesgue measurable and let Gs : [0;1] ! X be such that Gs(i) = F(i)(s), where s is a ¯xed element
of S. Then, Gs is strongly Lebesgue measurable for all s 2 S.
Proof: Let jj ¢ jjX denote the norm in X and jj ¢ jj denote the norm in Bb(S;X). By assumption,
there is a sequence fFng, with Fn : [0;1] ! Bb(S;X) simple, such that jjFn(i) ¡ F(i)jj ! 0 for
almost all i 2 [0;1]. Fix s 2 S and de¯ne Gn;s : [0;1] ! X to be such that Gn;s(i) = Fn(i)(s).
Then, fGn;sg is a sequence of simple functions. Moreover,
jjGn;s(i) ¡ Gs(i)jjX = jjFn(i)(s) ¡ F(i)(s)jjX · jjFn(i) ¡ F(i)jj;
and so jjGn;s(i)¡Gs(i)jj ! 0 for almost all i 2 [0;1]. Hence, Gs is strongly Lebesgue measurable.
Corollary 2. Let S, X, and F be as in Lemma 8. Suppose © : [0;1] ! S is measurable and has a
countable range. Then, G : [0;1] ! X given by G(i) = F(i)(©(i)) is strongly Lebesgue measurable.
Proof: Let fsng ½ S be the range of © and notice that G(i) =
P1
n=1 Gsn(i)Ifsng(©(i)), where Gs
is de¯ned as above. The desired result now follows from Lemma 8 and the fact that the pointwise
limit of a sequence of strongly Lebesgue measurable functions is strongly Lebesgue measurable, see
Lemma 11.37 in Aliprantis and Border (1999).
20For the next two results, recall that § denotes the ¾-algebra of the Lebesgue measurable subsets
of the unit interval [0;1].
Lemma 9. Let S be a separable metric space, ¸ : [0;1] ! P(S) be a transition probability from
([0;1];§) into S, and suppose F : [0;1] ! Bb(S) is strongly Lebesgue measurable. The function
h : [0;1] ! R such that h(i) =
R
F(i)(s)¸(dsji) is Lebesgue measurable.10
Proof: By Lemma 11.36 in Aliprantis and Border (1999), F is Lebesgue measurable and there exist
a separable subset X of Bb(S) and a Lebesgue measurable subset I0 of [0;1] such that ¹(I0) = 0
and F(i) 2 X for all i = 2 I0. De¯ne T : [0;1] £ X ! R to be such that T(i;f) =
R
f(s)¸(dsji).
Notice that T is a Carath¶ eodory function; i.e., T(i;¢) : X ! R is continuous for each i 2 [0;1], and
T( ¢ ;f) : [0;1] ! R is Lebesgue measurable for each f 2 X. Hence, by Lemma 4.50 in the same
book, T is § ­ B(X) measurable. Now let b f be an element of X and de¯ne F0 : [0;1] ! Bb(S) to
be such that F0(i) = F(i) if i 2 (I0)c and F0(i) = b f if i 2 I0. Since ª : [0;1] ! X £ I given by
ª(i) = (F0(i);i) is Lebesgue measurable, so is T ± ª : [0;1] ! R. Because T ± ª di®ers from h on
a set of Lebesgue measure zero, we have the desired result.
Corollary 3. Let S be a metric space, and S1;S2 be separable metric spaces. Suppose º 2 P(S2),
¸1 : [0;1] ! P(S1) is a transition probability from ([0;1];§) into S1, F : [0;1] ! Bb(S;Bb(S1))
is strongly Lebesgue measurable, and © : I ! S is measurable and has a countable range. De¯ne
¸2 : [0;1] ! P(S1 £ S2) to be such that if D1 2 B(S1) and D2 2 B(S2), then






The map ¸2 is a transition probability from ([0;1];§) into S1 £ S2.
Proof: Let D be the subset of B(S1 £ S2) such that if D 2 D, then the map i 7! ¸2(i)(D) is
Lebesgue measurable. By Lemmas 8 and 9, D contains the algebra generated by the rectangles of
S1 £ S2. Moreover, a straightforward argument shows that D is a monotone class. Hence, by the
monotone class lemma, see Lemma 4.12 in Aliprantis and Border (1999), D = B(S1 £S2), and the
desired result holds.
10Notice that if g : [0;1]£S ! R is such that g(i;s) = F(i)(s), then it is not necessary that g is jointly measurable.
Hence, this result is not immediate.
21Appendix B
Here we construct the map M that takes strategy pro¯les into (in¯nite) sequences of matching
vectors. The starting point is the map ¿2 : [0;1] £ £ £ ¤ ! P(H2). For this, let ¿1 : £ ! P(H1)
be the transition probability such that if D 2 B(Y ), then ¿1(µ)(fjg £ D £ fkg) = 1
N2¹j(Djµj).
By de¯nition, ¿1(µ)(D) is the probability that any agent in the economy experiences a period zero
action-observation pair that lies in D 2 B(H1). Fix µ 2 £ and F 2 ¤, and suppose D1 2 B(Z) and
D2 2 B(Y ). Now de¯ne the set function b ¿2(i) to be such that






The unique extension of b ¿2(i) to B(H2) is ¿2(i;µ;F). By Corollary 3 in Appendix A, for each µ 2 £
and F 2 ¤, the map ¿2( ¢ ;µ;F) is a transition probability from ([0;1];§) into H2. From ¿2 we
can construct, by the process described in Section 3, the map m2 : A £ £ £ ¤ ! [0;1] such that
m2(j;µ;F) is the fraction of agents who choose j in period two when the state of the world is µ
and the strategy pro¯le under play is F.
Suppose then, by induction, that for some t ¸ 2 there exist:
(1) A map ¿t : [0;1] £ £ £ ¤ ! P(Ht) such for each µ 2 £ and F 2 ¤, ¿t( ¢ ;µ;F) is the transition
probability from ([0;1];§) into Ht with the property that if D 2 B(Ht), then ¿t(i;µ;F)(D) is the
probability that agent i experiences a period t history in D when the state of the world is µ and
the strategy pro¯le under play is F.
(2) A map mt : A£££¤ : [0;1] ! [0;1] such that mt(j;µ;F) is the fraction of agents who choose
j in period t when the state of the world is µ and the strategy pro¯le under play is F.
Fix µ 2 £ and F 2 ¤, and de¯ne b ¿t+1(i) to be the set function such that






for all D1 2 B(Ht) and D2 2 B(Y ). This set function admits an unique extension to B(Ht+1) that
we denote by ¿t+1(i;µ;F). By de¯nition, ¿t+1(i;µ;F)(D) is the probability that agent i experiences
a period t + 1 history in D 2 B(Ht+1) as a function of the state of the world µ and the strategy
pro¯le F. Corollary 3 in Appendix A implies that the map ¿t+1( ¢ ;µ;F) is a transition probability
from ([0;1];§) in Ht+1.




This map is well-de¯ned by Theorem 13.4 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) together with Corollary
2 in Appendix A. By Lemma 9 in Appendix A, pt+1(¢;j;µ;F) is Lebesgue measurable for all j 2 A,




is also well-de¯ned. By construction, mt+1(j;µ;F) is the fraction of agents who choose j in period
t + 1 when the state of the world is µ and the strategy pro¯le under play is F.
We can then conclude, by induction, that there exists a map M = fMtg : ¤ ! ¥ such that
Mt(F) = fmt(j;µ;F)gj2A;µ2£ is the vector of period t matching probabilities if F is the strategy
pro¯le being played.
Appendix C
Lemma 10. For each ¼0 2 ¦ and m 2 ¥, the maps ¼t(¢;¼0;m) : Ht ! ¦ are measurable.
Proof: Fix ¼0 and m = fmtg. First notice that Assumption 2 implies that Bt is continuous in
x1, and so is jointly continuous in (j;x), for all t 2 N. In particular, ¼1( ¢ ;¼0;m) = B1(¼0; ¢ ;m)
is measurable. Suppose then, by induction, that there exists k 2 N such that ¼k( ¢ ;¼0;m) is
measurable. If we show that the maps Bt are jointly measurable in (¼;j;x), we are done, since this
implies that ¼k+1( ¢ ;¼0;m) = Bk(¼k( ¢ ;¼0;m); ¢ ;m) is measurable. For this, ¯x j and x, and let
fmng be given by mt;n = 1
n b mt + n¡1
n mt, where b m = fb mtg is such that b mt(j;µ) ´ 1
S+1. Moreover,
let Bt;n : ¦ ! ¦ be such that Bt;n(¼) = Bt(¼;j;x;mn). By construction, Bt;n is continuous for all
t;n 2 N, as its denominator is always positive. It is straightforward to show that for each ¼ 2 ¦,
Bt;n(¼) converges to Bt(¼;j;x;m). Therefore, Bt( ¢ ;j;x;m) is measurable. By Lemma 4.50 in
Aliprantis and Border (1999), we can then conclude that Bt is jointly measurable in (¼;j;x), the
desired result.
23Lemma 11. For each m 2 ¥, the map ½t( ¢ ;m) given by (4) is a continuous transition probability
from ¦ £ A in ¦.
Proof: Fix m 2 ¥. Let h : ¦ ! R be a continuous function and suppose f¼ng is a sequence in ¦



























It is straightforward to show º(¼n;j;m) converges to º(¼;j;m) in norm.11 Since h±Bt is a bounded
function, the ¯rst term on the right-hand side of (C.3) converges to zero. Now observe that
Bt(¼n;j;x;m) converges to Bt(¼;j;x;m) for º(¼;j;m)-almost all x 2 X. Hence, by the dominated
convergence theorem, the second term on the right-hand side of (C.3) also converges to zero.
Proof of Lemma 1: First notice that V
¤
t is bounded. Now de¯ne V t;n : Ht ! R, with t 2 N
and n 2 Z+, to be such that V t;0 ´ 0 and V t;n = TtV t+1;n¡1. Because the maps qt(¢;¼0;m) are
transition probabilities from Ht £ A into Ht+1, the operator Tt maps measurable functions into
measurable functions. Hence, for each t 2 N, the elements of fV t;ngn2Z+ are measurable. Since
fV t;ng converges pointwise to V
¤
t for all t 2 N, see Theorem 14.5 in Hinderer (1970), V
¤
t is also
measurable. To ¯nish, observe, by Theorem 14.4 in the same book, that fV
¤
tg solves (2). The
desired result is then a consequence of Lemma 7 in Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 4: Consider the map T = fTtg : Bb(¦)1 ! Bb(¦)1 such that if v = fvtg 2
Bb(¦)1, then Tv = fTtvt+1g = fmaxj2A Tt;jvt+1g. We know, from the proof of Lemma 7, that T
is a contraction in Bb(¦)1. Now let Bj be the subset of Bb(¦)1 such that if v = fvtg 2 Aj, then
Tt;kvt+1(¼) ¡ Tt;jvt+1(¼) · SjkW¤
j (¼) ¡ SjjW¤
j (¼)
for all k 6= j, ¼ 2 ¦, and t 2 N. This set is a closed subset of Bb(¦)1. If we show that T maps Bj
into itself, then fV ¤
t g 2 Bj by a standard argument. In what follows we omit ¼ when convenient.
It is also convenient to introduce the operators Qt;j such that Tt;jv = sj + ¯Qt;jv.
11Recall that if S is a metric space and º 2 P(S), then the norm of º is the supremum of
R
f(s)º(ds) over all
f 2 Bb(S) such that jjfjjsup · 1.
24Let v = fvtg 2 Bj. First notice that
Tt+1vt+2 = Tt+1;jvt+2 + max
k6=j
f 0 ;Tt+1;kvt+2 ¡ Tt+1;jvt+2g





= Tt+1;jvt+2 ¡ SjjW¤
j + W¤
j :
A similar argument shows that Tt+1vt+2 ¸ Tt+1;kvt+2¡SjkW¤
j +W¤
j if k 6= j. Since Qt;kQt+1;jvt+2 =
Qt;jQt+1;kvt+2 for all k;j 2 A, we then have that k 6= j implies that
Tt;kTt+1vt+2 ¡ Tt;jTt+1vt+2
· Tt;kTt+1;jvt+2 ¡ Tt;kSjjW¤
j + Tt;kW¤
j ¡ Tt;jTt+1;kvt+2 + Tt;jSjkW¤
j ¡ Tt;jW¤
j
= (1 ¡ ¯)(rk ¡ rj) + ¯Tt;k(W¤
j ¡ SjjW¤
j ) + Tt;jSjkW¤
j ¡ Tt;jW¤
j : (C.4)
Now observe that W¤
j ¡ SjjW¤
j = ¡rj + (1 ¡ ¯)W¤
j is convex. By Lemma 3.1 in Banks and
Sundaram (1992), for each j 2 A and t 2 N, the operator Qt;j maps convex functions into convex
functions. Hence, by repeated application of Jensen's inequality,
Qt;k(W¤
j ¡ SjjW¤









where (Qt)n is the nth iterate of Qt. By Lemma 12 below, if v : ¦ ! R is continuous, then (Qt)nv
converges pointwise to
P
µ2£ v(±µ)¼(µ) for all t 2 N. Therefore,
¯Qt;k(W¤
j ¡ SjjW¤





= (1 ¡ ¯)SjkW¤
j ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(rk ¡ rj) ¡ rj: (C.5)
To ¯nish, notice that: (A) SjkW¤
j is linear, and so Tt;jSjkW¤
j = rj + ¯SjkW¤
j ; and (B) W¤
j is
convex, and so Tt;jW¤
j ¸ SjjW¤
j by Jensen's inequality. From (A), (B), (C.4), and (C.5), we can
then conclude that if fwtg = fTtvt+1g, then
Tt;kwt+1(¼) ¡ Tt;jwt+1(¼) · SjkW¤
j (¼) ¡ SjjW¤
j (¼)
for all k 6= j, ¼ 2 ¦, and t 2 N, the desired result.
25Lemma 12. Suppose v : ¦ ! R is continuous. Then, for all t 2 N and ¼ 2 ¦, (Qt)nv(¼) converges
to
P
µ2£ v(±µ)¼(µ) as t ! 1.
Proof: We omit the dependence of ºµ
t (j;m), ½t(¼;j;m), and Bt(¼;j;x;m) on both m and t, as
these parameters play no role in the argument. Accordingly, we drop the dependence of Qt on t.
Let W = XN and denote a typical element of this set by w. Then, W is the set of all
possible observations after N action choices and meetings in society. Now let B(¼;w) 2 ¦ be
the updated belief when ¼ is the prior, actions 1 to N are consecutively chosen, and w 2 W is
observed. Moreover, let ªµ
1 be the Borel measure on W1 that extends the measures ªµ
n = £n
t=1ªµ,
where ªµ = £N
j=1ºµ(j). To ¯nish, de¯ne fBngn2N, with Bn : ¦ £ W1 ! ¦, to be such that if
w1 = fwng 2 W1, then: (i) B1(¼;w1) = B(¼;w1); (ii) Bn(¼;w1) = B(Bn¡1(¼;w1);wn) for








Fix µ. Lemma 3 implies that if ¼ 2 int ¦, the interior of ¦, then fBn(¼; ¢ )gn2N converges
ªµ
1-almost surely to ±µ. Fix ¼ 2 int ¦, let ² > 0, and suppose v : ¦ ! R is continuous. For any
· > 0, let Nµ
n;· = fjjBn(¼; ¢ ) ¡ ±µjj > ·g. Because almost sure convergence implies convergence in
measure, ªµ
1(Nµ
n;·) ! 0 as n ! 1. Therefore, there exists k0(·;µ) 2 N such that if n ¸ k0(·;µ),
then ªµ
1(Nµ
n;·) · ²M=4, where M = jjvjjsup. Now let ± > 0 be such that if jjx ¡ x0jj < ±, then















































Since £ is ¯nite, Qnv(¼) !
P
µ2£ ¼(µ)v(±µ). To ¯nish, notice that Qnv(¼) =
P
µ2£ ¼(µ)v(±µ) for
all n 2 N when ¼ belongs to the boundary of ¦.
12The functions Bn are measurable by Lemma 10.
26Appendix D
Proof of Lemma 5: Let F¤ be a perfect bayesian equilibrium. By Appendix B, there exists
a sequence of maps ¿t : [0;1] £ £ ! P(Ht) such that: (i) if D 2 B(Ht), then ¿t(i;µ)(D) is the
probability that agent i experiences a period t history in D when the state of the world is µ
and the strategy pro¯le is F¤; (ii) ¿t( ¢ ;µ) is a transition probability from ([0;1];§) into Ht. By
Kolmogorov's extension theorem, for each i 2 [0;1] and µ 2 £, the probability measures ¿t(i;µ)
admit an unique extension to P(H1) that we denote by ¿(i;µ). By de¯nition, ¿(i;µ)(D) is the
probability that i experiences an in¯nite history in D 2 B(H1) when the state of the world is
µ and the strategy pro¯le is F¤. Let Ht = fG ½ H1 : G = D £ Z¡t; where D 2 B(Ht)g and
D be the subset of B(H1) such that if D 2 D, then i 7! ¿(i;µ)(D) is Lebesgue measurable. By
construction, D contains
S1
t=1 Ht. Since D is also a monotone class, the monotone class lemma
implies that D = B(H1). Hence, for each µ 2 £, the map ¿( ¢ ;µ) is a transition probability from
([0;1];§) into H1.










m=t Em;j ¾ Et;j; i.e., Ej denotes the event where j is chosen
in¯nitely many times. Since Et
j # Ej, ¿(i;µ)(Ej) = limt ¿(i;µ)(Et
j) for all i 2 [0;1]. Therefore,
mt(j;µ;F¤) converges to zero if ¿(i;µ)(Ej) = 0 almost surely. Suppose then, by contradiction, that
mt(j;µ;F¤) does not converge to zero. This implies that there is I0 µ [0;1] with ¹(I0) > 0 such
that ¿(i;µ)(Ej) > 0 for all i 2 I0. Consequently, a positive measure of agents chooses j an in¯nite
number of times. Since all agents have non-dogmatic priors, Lemma 3 implies that any agent who
chooses j in¯nitely often learns its true type with probability one. In particular, if ¼t denotes the
period t belief of such an agent, there is t0 2 N such that if t ¸ t0, then lN(¼t) > 0 with probability
one, a contradiction by Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let F¤ be a perfect bayesian equilibrium and suppose the state of the world
is b µ 2 £(j). We divide the argument in several small steps.
(A) For each t 2 N, let Xt = fG µ X1 j G = H £ X¡t; where H 2 B(Xt)g. Recall that X is the
observation space. Consider an agent who chooses j in all periods, including zero. For each µ 2 £,
27the probability that he observes an in¯nite history of one-period observations in G 2
S1
t=1 Xt can
be computed from the transition probabilities fºµ
t gt2Z+. Denote the set function obtained in this
way by ´j(µ). By Kolmogorov's extension theorem, ´j(µ) admits an unique extension to P(X1)
that we also denote by ´j(µ). To ¯nish this step, let ´j(¼) be the unique probability measure on
B(µ £X1) such that ´j(¼)(£0 £G) =
P
µ2£0 ¼(µ)´j(Gjµ) for all £0 µ £ and G 2 B(X1), where ¼
is some given prior belief.
(B) For each µ 2 £ and t 2 Z+, let ¼µ;t(¼) = E´j(¼)[Ifµg£X1jGt], where G0 = f;;£ £ X1g and
Gt = f;;£g£Xt for t ¸ 1. Then, ¼µ;0(¼) ´ ¼(µ) and ¼µ;t, with t ¸ 1, is the period t (unconditional)
posterior belief that the state of the world is µ for any agent with prior ¼ who chooses j in every
period. By Levy's theorem, see Theorem 3, p. 510, in Shiryaev (1996), ¼µ;t(¼) converges ´j(¼)-
almost surely to ¼µ;1(¼) = E´j(¼)[Ifµg£X1jG1], where G1 = ¾(
S1
t=0 Gt).
(C) We know that if ¼ 2 ¦ puts probability one on b µ, then lj(¼) = rj(b µj) ¡ maxk6=j rk(b µk), which
is greater than zero by assumption. Consequently, there exists ® 2 (0;1) such that lj(¼) > 0 if
¼(b µ) ¸ 1 ¡ 2®. Consider then the sequence fLt(¼)gt2Z+ with Lt(¼) = ¼b µ;t(¼) ¡ (1 ¡ ®), and let
L1(¼) = ¼b µ;1(¼) ¡ (1 ¡ ®). De¯ne ¿(¼) to be such that ¿(¼) = infft 2 Z+ : Lt(¼) < 0g, with the
convention that the in¯mum of an empty set is 1. Notice that f¿(¼) = tg 2 Gt for all t 2 Z+[f1g.
In particular, ¿(¼) is a stopping time with respect to the ¯ltration fGtgt2Z+. Now let L¿(¼) be the





Lt(¼) if ¿ = t
L1(¼) if ¿ = 1
:
By Proposition A.1 in Banks and Sundaram (1992), E´j(¼)[L¿(¼)] = E´j(¼)[L0(¼)], from which we
can conclude that E´j(¼)[L¿(¼)] = ¼(b µ) ¡ (1 ¡ ®).
(D) Let ¦0
j(b µ) = f¼ 2 ¦ : ¼(b µ) ¸ 1 ¡ ® and ¼(µ) = 0 if µk 6= b µk for k 6= jg. By de¯nition, an agent
with prior belief in ¦0
j(b µ) knows the true type of k 6= j and assigns high enough probability to the
event that µ = b µ. Notice that ¦0
j(b µ) ½ ¦d. By item C and the de¯nition of ¦0
j(b µ), E´j(¼)[L¿(¼)] ¸ 0
if ¼ 2 ¦0
j(b µ). Hence, ¼ 2 ¦0
j(b µ) implies that ´j(¼)(f¿(¼) = 1g) > 0. In particular, there exists
G 2 B(X1) and e µ 2 £ such that ¼(e µ) > 0, ´j(Gje µ) > 0, and ¿(¼) = 1 in fe µg £ G. This last
result follows from the de¯nition of ´j(¼). Theorem 1 then implies that the following is true for a
measure one of agents: if they have a prior belief in ¦0
j(b µ) and choose j in period zero, then they
28choose j in every t ¸ 1 when the state of the world is e µ. Suppose, by contradiction, that e µ 6= b µ. By
Lemma 3, an agent who chooses j in¯nitely many times learns its true type with probability one,
regardless of the meetings in society. Since an agent with prior ¼ in ¦0
j(b µ) already knows the true
type of k 6= j, ¼b µ;t(¼) converges to zero ´j(¼)-almost surely in fe µg £ G. This, however, contradicts
the fact that ¼b µ;t(¼) ¸ 1 ¡ ® in this set.
(E) This completes the ¯rst part of the proof. Let Mt = ¼b µ;t ¡ (1 ¡ 2®) and de¯ne ¿+(¼) to be
such that ¿+(¼) = infft 2 Z+ : Mt < 0g. Notice that ¿+(¼) = 1 if ¿(¼) = 1. Now let ¦j(b µ) be
the subset of f¼ 2 ¦d : ¼(b µ) > 0g with the property that if an agent has a prior ¼ in ¦j(b µ), then
there is G 2 B(X1) with ´j(Gjb µ) > 0 such that ¿+(¼) = 1 in fb µg £ G. This set is non-empty by
the above reasoning. In what follows we use a continuity argument to show that ¦j(b µ) is an open
subset of ¦d. The full support assumption together with Theorem 1 and the assumption that all
agents randomize in period zero then imply that there is a positive measure of agents who choose
j in every t ¸ 1.
(F) Fix ¼ 2 ¦j(b µ) and let f¼ng 2 ¦d be such that lim¼n = ¼. Assume, without loss, that ¼n(b µ) > 0
for all n 2 N. Moreover, let G 2 B(X1) be such that ´j(Gjb µ) > 0 and ¿(¼) = 1 in fb µg£G. Since
¼b µ;t(¼) ¸ 1¡® in fb µg£G for all t 2 N, ¼b µ;1(¼) ¸ 1¡® ´j(¼)-almost surely in fb µg£G. Now observe
that ´j(¼n) converges to ´j(¼) in (variation) norm. Corollary 3.2 in Crimaldi and Pratelli (2005)
then implies that ¼b µ;t(¼n) converges to ¼b µ;1(¼) in ´j(¼)-measure as t;n ! 1. Hence, there exists
G0 µ G with ´j(G0jb µ) > 0 and t0;n0 2 N such that ¼b µ;t(¼n) > 1¡2® on fb µg£G0 if t ¸ t0 and n ¸ n0.
Also notice that for each t 2 N, ¼b µ;t(¼n) converges pointwise to ¼b µ;t(¼). Therefore, by Egoro®'s
theorem, there exist n1 2 N and G00 µ G0 with ´j(G00jb µ) > 0 such that ¼b µ;t(¼n) > 1¡2® in fb µg£G00
for all t 2 f1;:::;t0 ¡ 1g if n ¸ n1. We can then conclude that for all t 2 N, ¼b µ;t(¼n) > 1 ¡ 2® in
fb µg £ G00 if n ¸ maxfn0;n1g, the desired result.
Lemma 13. Suppose that if µ 2 £ is such that z1(µ1) · z2(µ2) = z, then mt(1;µ;F¤) converges
to zero in any perfect bayesian equilibrium F¤. Let the state of the world be µ with z2(µ2) = z and
suppose that F¤ is a perfect bayesian equilibrium where mt(1;µ;F¤) converges to some ® 2 (0;1).
Then, with probability one, an agent with a non-dogmatic prior who chooses 2 in¯nitely many times
learns that z1 is greater than z.
29Proof: Consider an agent who chooses 2 in¯nitely many times. We can restrict attention to an
agent who follows an optimal strategy.13 By Corollary 1, he can only choose 1 a ¯nite number
of times. Hence, without loss, we can assume that he chooses 2 in all periods. Let Âµ 2 P(X1)
be such that if D 2 B(X1), then Âµ(D) is the probability that this agent experiences an in¯nite
history of one-period observations that belongs to D. Denote a typical element of X1 by x = fxtg,
where xt = (x1t;x2t) 2 Y £ A is the period t observation. Now let bt : X1 ! f0;1g be such that
bt(x) = 1 if x2t = 2 and bt(x) = 0 otherwise. By construction, EÂµ[bt] = mt(2;µ;F¤). Moreover, let
yt : X1 ! R be such that yt(x) = x1t. Notice that the random variables fbtgt2Z+ and fytgt2Z+
are independent. In what follows we omit the dependence of the matching probabilities on F¤
Suppose the agent under consideration has a non-dogmatic prior ¼0 and assume, without loss,
that mt(j;µ) > 0 for all j and t. Let ft(bt;µ) = mt(2;µ)btmt(1;µ)1¡bt. If ¼(¢j¼0;y0;b0;:::;yt;bt) is



















n=0(1 ¡ bn)°n(1) +
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Let £0 = fµ 2 £ : z2(µ2) = z and z1(µ1) > zg, £00 = fµ 2 £ : z2(µ) = z and z1(µ1) · zg, and
b £ = £0 [ £00. Notice that µ 2 £0. From now on, all almost sure statements are with respect to
Âµ. There are two cases to consider. If µ2 6= µ2, Lemma 3 implies that ¼(µjy0;b0;:::) converges to
zero almost surely. Suppose then that µ2 = µ2 and µ 2 £00. Notice that »n ´ 0 in this case. Since
VarÂµ(bt) · 1=4 and
Pt















mn(2;µ) ! 1 ¡ ® > 0
almost surely. Now observe that mt(1;µ) ! ® > 0 and mt(1;µ) ! 0 by assumption. Hence, f°t(2)g
is bounded while °t(1) ! 1. This implies that (1 + t)¡1 lnLt ! 1 almost surely, and so Lt ! 1
almost surely as well. Therefore, ¼(µj¼0;y0;b0;:::) ! 0 almost surely, the desired result.
13This lemma is true without this restriction, but the proof is longer.
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